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I. Introduction
In a recent paper, G. Dantzig [2] has formulated a model
for resource allocation in the so called "Divvy Institutional
Economy". The author proves the existance of a general equi-
librium solution to the economic problem ( in terms of prices
and quantities of input factors and final goods) which at the
same time satisfies agreed upon shares of monetary flows allo-
cated to input resource groups and to output consumer groups.
The agreement upon the share values is carried out by a polit-
ical process, while the market mechanisms adjust the prices of
primary resource inputs and the relative sizes of the consumer
groups until those shares are satisfied. The inputs ｡ ｾ ､ out-
puts and the production and transformation technology are pre-
sented in an Input-Output format.
The formulization of the resource allocation problem takes
into account the presence of institutionalized forces together
with the market mechanism. Examples can be taken from empirical
observation (collective bargaining, Congressional Budget Approval,
indexed prices of raw material) is per se a major innovation with
respect to more classical results. In the following sections we
we will try to view the Divvy results in relation to the classic
economic formulation of the problem and study possible implicat-
ions of it.
The general framework will be the welfare maximization
problem for the economy and the general equilibrium conditions
that are derived from it. The model that is going to be the
background of our exposition is presented in the Appendix 1
following a classical formulation. The consumer and producer
i = 1 , ... , r
k = 1 , ••• , n
i = 1 , . . . , r
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sectors of the Divvy Economy will be reformulated in the light
of the behavioral models presented there.
We will try to maintain the notations in [2]. We will
assume 1, ... ,r resource groups and 1, ... ,s consumer groups.
There are 1, .... ,n economic sectors which buy resources xi
to produce final goods Yk' k = 1, ... ,n. Pk'
will represent prices of final goods and and Ai'
prices of primary resources; the relative sizes of
-tile groups will be given by ｾ ｪ Ｇ j = 1, ... , s.
2. A Welfare Maximization Problem Compatible with the Divvy
Economy
Consider the following optimization problem
max
ｸ Ｌ ｹ ｾ ｏ
u =
s n
II II
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=
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r Ct ik
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V k
V k
v i
(2.1.1)
(2.1.2)
(2.1.3)
The objective function is a welfare function for the society
where Yjk is the quantity of final good k consumed by a member
of group j, and ]1. is its relative size. (2.1.1) is an avail-
J
ability constraint for each final good, and (2.1.2) represents
the technology producing k. (2.1.3) is an availability con-
straint in primary inputs. Problem (2.1) does not differ sig-
nificantly from the classical welfare maximization problems [3].
The only innovation is to consider the groups rather than single
individuals in the index of welfare that has been chosen. If
Pk is the multiplier in the combined constraints (2.1.1) and
(2.1.2·) and Ai is the multiplier in (2.1.3), we can write the
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two behavioral models associated with (2.1).
The consumer utility maximization sub model would be
s.t.
max U =
L
s M Sjk kSjk
II (IT y'k )]1.
j == 1 k=1 J J
(2.2)
L L PkY 'k]1· = 1k j J J
where 1 is a normalized value for the income of the society.
In the Divvy Economy the Yjk are considered given as somehow
"typical" consumption patterns for the groups, and in that case
the optimization is carried over ]1 .. (2.2) converts then to
J
s.t.
max
]1':0
s
U = k 1 IIj=1
(2.3)
n
where S. = L SkJ' is a parameter.
J k=1
S· > 0,J -
s
Lj=1 s' = 1.J .
(2.3.1)
the necessary
s SL ]1J' j.j=1
If v is the Lagrange multiplier of (2.3.1),
conditions given, after solving for v = k 1
v j (2.4)
together with ]1. > ° and (2.3.1).J -
Similarly, the producer efficiency maximization sub model
would be,
r
min L a.x,1 1
x i=1
s.t.
r
< II a.y X' 1
i=1 1
(2.5)
(2.5.1)
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(2.5) is actually an aggregated model of the index of output
across sectors, i.e., (2.5.1) would actually be written as
n r (Xik
11 II x ikk=1 i=1
=
r
II
i=1
(X,
1
X.
1
n
with a ik = Bka i and Ii=1
a, = 1, a, > O.
1 1 -
Since the Divvy Economy takes A as the variables, we want
the equivalent problem to (2.5) in terms of A. This is provided
by the IIdual ll problem of (2.5). The concept of duality and the
specific dual for problems of the form (2.5) are treated in [4].
s. t.
min
A
L A.X.ill (2.5) ,
n a.
k II A. 1 > 1
2 i= 1 1
n -a. *
where k 2 = II a l, ly, and L a.X. -i=1 i 1. 1.
(2.5.1) I
*for x. solving
1.
(2.5). (2.5.1)' scalled to 1 since L
i
A.X, = 1-
1. 1.
The first order condition to (2.5)' gives
A.X,
1. 1.
---- = A.X' = (x.
n 1. 1 1L A,x,
i=1 1 1
or in more disaggregated form,
V i (2. 6)
A.x. =
1 1
n n
I Al,X l' k = L al'k == (Xl'k=1 k=1 v i (2.7)
Equations (2.4) and (2.7) together with the accounting conditions
r s
that industry makes zero profit, I A,x'k = L P ｙＧｫｾＧ and
i== 1 1 1 j =,- r J J
aggregate value of inputs equal aggregate value of outputs,
characterize the general equilibrium conditions. Since Pr' Yjk
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and x ik to achieve Yjk are assumed given, the conditions are
stated in terms of A and p. Moreover, by computing the value
x,. across final sectors k, (2.3.1) could be written as1J
I I
i j
A.X .. ]J. = 11 1J 1
where x. in (2.5) would be equal to
1
Using these results, (2. 4)
s
L x iJ' ]JJ' = xi·j=1
and (2.7) would be now
r
I A.X .. ]J. = B.
i=1 1 1J ] ]
s
I A. x .. lJ ' = a,.j=1 1 1J J 1
\/ j
\/.
1
(2.8)
(2.9)
(2.8) and (2.9) are equivalent to (18)
a, = A, and M.. = x. . .1 1 1J 1J
3. Critique of the Model
in [1 . p. 12] for 8. = <5.J J
In the previous section we have shown that the behavioral
models of consumer utility maximization and producer efficiency
maximization in the way they are formulated in classical economic
theory, under assumptions similar to those in Divvy Economy
(fixed consumption pattern for each group), give results that
are consistent with the ones implied by the Divvy Economy in
terms of solutions satisfying general equilibrium conditions.
However, the behavioral assumptions of both models are very
differant and would call for differant understandings of the
economic problem. The decision on which model truly represents
the actual behavior is difficult to make because the shares of
flows would have to be observed from empirical results and
either model could claim that were ｧ ｾ ｮ ･ ｲ ｡ ｴ ･ ､ under its ｡ ｳ ｳ ｵ ｭ ｰ ｾ
tions.
But apart from this ambuiguity, the models deserve other
comments on their assumptions. Divvy ·Economy, we think, makes
a valuable and justifiable point when arguing that the shares
-6- .
of flows are affected by the political process, something which
in the classical economic result is not very often ｣ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｩ ､ ･ ｲ ･ ､ ｾ
Nothing is said however, about the dynamics of the political
process and what social pressures actually determine those
shares. Rather, by introducing a new variable, the adjustable
size of the groups, the system has enough degrees of freedom to
minimize the effects of political decisions in the economic
sector, together with the fact that the shares are stated in
monetary terms and not in real ones.
Observing the functioning of the political process, one
can claim that there exist social groups bargaining for the
shares of the 9utcome of the economy, in real terms. The groups
are rather fixed and very often have strict control of member-
ship to maintain their competitive advantage. To distinguish
between resource groups and consumer groups is difficult since,
except for retired people, the rest participate directly in the
production process (in a broad sense), and a good part of their
share is determined already by the remunerations for their con-
tribution. The groups that do not feel satisfied by the strict
economic share that marginal productivity criteriums would assign
to them, make use of the political system and force redistributive
actions by the Government. An example would be the lIincome policyll
whose aim is to achieve income redistribution through taxation, an
indirect consequence of the policy is its contribution to political
stability by reducing social differences. Another example at the
international level would be to aid programs of the developed
countries in favor of the less developed ones, while a manifes-
tation of the power of the resource groups is the ability of the
OPEC countries to control the price of oil. In this last case
note however, the concern of those countries in changing the
prices so that their share of flows is always maintained in real
terms.
The previous analysis suggests new formulations of the
resource allocation problem. Although technological and economic
1The introduction of budgetary constraints for the Government
sector in some models [1] could be interpreted as an example of
this consideration.
-7-
relationships must not be put aside, the political power of the
social groups in controlling the economic resources and in the
decisions about the selections of a particular technological
option need to be better understood.
Appendix
Formulation of a General Equilibrium Problem Consistent with
our Behavioral Models
Given a vector of final goods y produced by a technological
relationship of the form y = F(x), where x is a vector of inputs
available in quantities h, for a utility function on y, U(y), the
problem is2
s.t.
max u(y)y
y < F(x)
x < h
A1
The solution to A1 will satisfy the Pareto condition that
*u(y ) ｾ U(y) for all feasible y.
If P and A are the vector dual variables associated with
the first and second constraint in A1, the consumer utility
maximization problem subject to the budget constraint
s.t.
max U(y)
Y
py = M A2
and the producer efficiency maximization (cost minimization)
problem
s.t.
min x
x
y < F(x) A3
will provide general equilibrium conditions consistent with A1
and consequently satisfying the Paretlan condition. Problems
A2 and A3 are called for this reason Paretian rules [3].
2 U and F are continuous concave twice differentiable
functions.
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The first order conditions are
= 0U1 y vp
1A - pF x = 0
(A.2.1)
(A.3.1)
where v is the marginal utility of income or scaling factor
that converts monetary output of the society into welfare
measures in utils. F(x) is assumed. homogeneous of degree one,
which means that at optimal py = AX = M. A general equilibrium
solution is the vectors y, X, p, A satisfying (A.2.1) and (A.3.1).
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